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INTRODUCTION
David Caplovitz earned a Ph.D. in Sociology from Columbia
University in 1960, became a director of Columbia University’s
Bureau of Applied Social Research, and then a Professor of
Sociology at the City College of New York.1 His Ph.D. thesis, which
investigated the spending habits of low-income urban consumers, was
published in 1963 by the Free Press, with the title, The Poor Pay
More.2 He is remembered today primarily for that book, and for
other writing on the subject of the financial difficulties faced by poor
consumers.3 The insights of David Caplovitz helped courts, law*
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1. See Wolfgang Saxon, Dr. David Caplovitz, an Authority On Spending Habits,
Dies at 64, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/03/obituaries/
dr-david-caplovitz-an-authority-on-spending-habits-dies-at-64.html [https://perma.cc/
Z3VG-TTHQ].
2. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOWINCOME FAMILIES (1963).
3. His other work on consumer finance, in chronological order, includes: David
Caplovitz, The Consumer Behavior of Low-Income Families, Nat’l Op. Research
Ctr., Univ. of Chi. (1961); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE EVENTS FOLLOWING UPON THE
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makers, and many middle-class Americans appreciate the
complicated relationship between culture, law, and the exploitation of
poor consumers.
This Symposium Issue is centered around the fiftieth anniversary of
the publication of The Poor Pay More, but please note that a
hardcover edition appeared earlier, in 1963—not 1967. This means
that we are celebrating, now, the fifty-fourth anniversary of the book.
Nevertheless, I applaud the Journal for its decision to hold an event
this year, which is the fiftieth anniversary of the paperback, and it is
the paperback whose publication occurred at the height of its major
impact.4
I would like to offer a short explanation about why The Poor Pay
More came to be among the most significant factors stimulating the
reconstruction of consumer financial protection law in America and
around the world.
I. UNRAVELING DREAMS FOR A GREAT SOCIETY
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November 1963
brought with it a period of political anxiety and social upheaval.5

DEFAULT (Bureau of Applied Research, Colum. Univ. 1970); DAVID CAPLOVITZ &
ERIC SINGLE, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT, (Bureau of Applied Soc. Research, Colum.
Univ. 1971); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE MERCHANTS OF HARLEM: A STUDY OF SMALL
BUSINESS IN A BLACK COMMUNITY (1973); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN
TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1974); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, MAKING
ENDS MEET: HOW FAMILIES COPE WITH INFLATION AND RECESSION (1979). Other
writings, in chronological order, include DAVID CAPLOVITZ ET AL., STUDENTFACULTY RELATIONS IN MEDICAL SCHOOL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Bureau of
Applied Social Research, Colum. Univ. 1960); DAVID CAPLOVITZ & CANDACE
ROGERS, SWASTIKA 1960: THE EPIDEMIC OF ANTI-SEMITIC VANDALISM IN AMERICA
(Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith 1961); David Caplovitz, In the Shadows of
the Bomb: An Inquiry into the Public Mood During the Cuban Crisis, Nat’l Op.
Research Ctr., Univ. of Chi. (1963); DAVID CAPLOVITZ & HARRY LEVY,
INTERRELIGIOUS DATING AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS (Bureau of Applied Soc.
Research, Colum. Univ. 1965); NORMAN M. BRADBURN & DAVID CAPLOVITZ,
REPORTS ON HAPPINESS (1965); David Caplovitz, The Drug Culture at the Work
Place, 6 INT’L J. SOC. 82 (1976); David Caplovitz, Involvement in the Broad Drug
Culture, 6 INT’L J. SOC. 111 (1976); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE WORKING ADDICT
(1976); DAVID CAPLOVITZ & FRED SHERROW, THE RELIGIOUS DROP-OUTS:
APOSTASY AMONG COLLEGE GRADUATES (1977); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, STUDENTFACULTY RELATIONS IN MEDICAL SCHOOL: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL
SOCIALIZATION (1980); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE STAGES OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
(1983).
4. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOWINCOME FAMILIES (1967) (paperpack).
5. For more on the historical events described herein, fine studies of this period
include ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES 1961–
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Hoping to mitigate traumatic discontinuity, Lyndon Johnson almost
immediately pushed forward plans for a “War on Poverty” as well as
a new Civil Rights Law that would, hopefully, become Kennedy’s
legacy as well as his own. Johnson took up these objectives and other
measures to build a “Great Society” with the determination that the
nation would combat racism and would combat poverty.
But combat in Southeast Asia interrupted his domestic crusades.
Military troops in Vietnam increased from approximately 16,000 at
the end of 1963 to 184,000 two years later.6 The buildup did not
defeat the enemy, however, and the difficulties of military success
emerged through daily news reports. The War became increasingly
unpopular. Particularly divisive was the class-biased, compulsory
military draft, which depended on the urban poor and readily
permitted college students’ deferments. The War also devoured the
domestic goals of the Johnson Administration. Budgetary resources
for the Great Society diminished, despite assurances that the nation
could afford guns, and butter, too.
Along with diminished resources came the disintegration of a social
consensus over domestic priorities and methods. The very spotlight
that had been cast by civil rights leaders and political progressives
also highlighted disagreements over the causes and cures for poverty
and for racism. From the mid-1960s, social indicators exposed a
generational divide between young people and their elders, a divide
over proper relations between the sexes, a divide over proper policing
and the treatment of criminal defendants, and—perhaps most
explosively—heightened racial antagonism.
II. RACE AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE
During the Johnson years, violence, vandalism, and civil disorder
appeared in scattered cities nationwide.7 During the summers of 1964
and 1965 riots happened in Rochester, New York; Harlem;
Philadelphia; and Watts, California. In 1966 there were race riots in
predominantly poor black neighborhoods in many more cities,
including Chicago, Atlanta, Cleveland, Lancing, Michigan, and

1973 (1999); ERIC F. GOLDMAN, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON (1969); DORIS
KEARNS GOODWIN, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1975).
6. See The Vietnam War: Military Statistics, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AM.
HISTORY, www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/seventies/resources/Vietnam-warmilitary-statistics [https://perma.cc/N5CA-DXZR] (using statistics from the United
States Department of Commerce).
7. See generally JANET L. ABU-LUGHOD, RACE, SPACE, AND RIOTS IN CHICAGO,
NEW YORK, AND LOS ANGELES (2007).
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Waukegan, Illinois. The following year, 1967, brought more rioting in
cities including Roxbury, Massachusetts; Durham, North Carolina;
Buffalo, New York; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Cairo, Illinois; Memphis,
Tennessee; Tampa, Florida; and Detroit, Michigan. In 1968—the
year in which Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy were
assassinated—there were large riots in Detroit, Chicago, and Newark.
In nearly all of these cities, significant property destruction occurred
as rioters trashed and burned retail stores and housing. Shootings
and stabbings caused injuries and fatalities. In several cases,
demonstrations prompted violent confrontations with police and
guardsmen. Business districts and white merchants appeared to be
specifically targeted by some rioters, and in many cases the damage to
stores was so severe that shopping districts never recovered.
III. THE SEARCH FOR GOOD EXPLANATIONS
Race riots have a long, sad history in America, but the rioting in
the 1960s was popularly understood in the white community as a new
social
pathology—frightening,
mysterious
and
nearly
incomprehensible.8 The compelling need to understand what was
going on was refracted through art, entertainment, and civic
discourse, in newspapers and magazines, and in the evening news.
Day after day, understanding the sources for unrest in inner cities
became an urgent concern. While white segregationists contended
that the riots were the result of racially integrated neighborhoods and
the erosion of respect for law and order, white liberals and many
leaders of the black community argued that the riots were the result
of inadequate job opportunities, segregated housing patterns, and
white racism more generally.9 Radicals on the Left argued that the
riots were the inevitable, bitter fruit of class and race oppression.10
In 1967 President Johnson established a National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, chaired by Governor Otto Kerner of
Illinois, to determine what was happening, why it was happening, and

8. See id. at 3–4 (2007); Daniel J. Myers, Racial Rioting in the 1960s: An Event
History Analysis of Local Conditions, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 94, 106 (1997) (revisiting
data and conclusions in Seymour Spilerman, The Causes of Racial Disturbances, 35
AM. SOC. REV. 627 (1970)); see also Virginia Postrel, The Consequences of the 1960s
Race Riots Come Into View, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/12/30/business/the-consequences-of-the-1960s-race-riots-come-into-view.html
[https://nyti.ms/2lnsfsH].
9. See ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 7, at 3–4.
10. See id at 4–7.
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how it could be prevented.11 After a period of study the Commission
offered an alarming prediction: “Our nation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”12 A principal
cause of urban violence, the report offered, was white racism. The
Commission proposed several ways to ameliorate the situation,
including more government programs to provide social services, more
diverse and sensitive police forces, and more investment in housing
programs to break up residential segregation.13
The prediction of an American version of Apartheid was ominous
to many, however, and the suggested solutions were threatening, out
of reach, or both. If the root cause was really racism, that was
incurable over any reasonable length of time, and the issue was
uncomfortably an issue redolent with moral blame. If it was housing
segregation, then the solution could be prohibitively expensive, and
take decades at best to accomplish.
***
As I have stated, The Poor Pay More had appeared more than two
years before the major rioting, in 1963, and it was one of several
rather dry, social-scientific efforts to address an important but not
necessarily urgent problem. It was not written with a popular
audience in mind, and it was not an especially good read.
But the need to understand causes and cures of urban poverty had
become a cultural imperative, and thus the book’s arguments drew
attention. Its clinical, denatured discussion of urban poverty provided
a much more palatable and practical explanation for the riots to the
American center than intrinsic white racism or capitalist class
oppression. According to Caplovitz, the riots, above all else, reflected
a failure to appreciate the importance of consumer finance and the
failure to protect consumers.14
The book reported the results of in-depth structured interviews
with 464 families in low-income housing projects in New York City,
and it stated its findings as sociological facts rather than policy
judgments.15 It probed the intersection of consumer problems, race,

11. U.S. KERNER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Nan Robertson, Sociologist Blames Anger at Merchants for Ghetto
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1966, at 39, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/
timesmachine/1966/10/11/90227845.html?pageNumber=39 [https://nyti.ms/2znaWxX].
15. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 2, at 2–4.
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and poverty, using the language of empirical social science—and at a
time when social scientific studies were broadly respected.
Caplovitz discovered that poor families consumed high-cost
durable goods, and paid higher prices for them than others, and yet,
despite their cost, they were often shoddy.16 He found that they
owned expensive items as often as people with higher income levels,
even though less expensive ones were available for those who chose
to be frugal.17 They bought in neighborhood stores or from peddlers,
instead of at department stores where there was more choice and
price variety.18 The poor bought using credit, but they were
unsophisticated about it and ended up paying more for the money
they borrowed.19 Because they were non-white, Caplovitz wrote, they
were subjected to discrimination by merchants who charged them
more for goods and more for credit.20 Additionally, because their
creditworthiness was poor or unestablished, traditional sources of
borrowing were closed off, and they were confined to a “deviant”
marketing system, in which illegal and unethical selling practices
predominated.21 They were more often the victims of oppressive debt
collections and repossessions.22 They commonly became desperate,
and sometimes violent, under their strain.23
Caplovitz identified a cycle of impoverishment-by-consumption.
Because they were young, these poor families had not yet
accumulated savings.24 Because they were poor, they were deprived
of status, and they were highly susceptible to advertising, which
encouraged them to treat nonessential goods as essential
compensation for their social position.25 Because they were just
beginning their adult lives, they needed consumer durables and were
eager to buy TVs, hi-fidelity stereo phonographs, and other objects
which were widely advertised as status symbols.26 Because many
were newcomers to cities, they were naïve about where to shop.27
Because they were in early stages of the family-life cycle, they had
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 82–87.
Id. at 84–86.
Id. at 87–90.
Id. at 90–93.
Id. at 87–90.
Id. at 157–67.
Id. at 141, 162.
Id. at 109–12.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
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insufficient wage income for purchases, and so required credit.28
Because these families were poor, they were denied credit at
reputable institutions while the disreputable credit sources charged
excessive rates.29
The circle of impoverished consumers went round and round,
generating great dissatisfaction, frustration, misery, and sometimes
violence. Poor consumers with meager consumer alternatives made
poor choices, which led to unmanageable debts, fewer good
purchasing alternatives, and even more extreme poverty and serious
legal problems.30 How to break the cycle? Caplovitz recommended
consumer education, consumer protection rules, and different sorts of
protective legislation.31 Consumer credit markets, except for usury
laws, were minimally regulated and insufficient.32 New consumer
assistance programs were imperative, as face-to-face interaction
between consumer credit counselors and poor consumers in
neighborhood consumer rights clinics was very important to breaking
the cycle of poverty.33
IV. EXPLAINING URBAN UNREST AS CONSUMER REVOLT
Late in 1966, the House Government Operations Committee
invited Caplovitz to testify about his ideas, which the New York
“Sociologist Blames Anger at
Times reported prominently.34
Merchants for Ghetto Violence,” it reported.35 “Ghetto violence in
Watts, Harlem and elsewhere was motivated by anger at merchants
who bilk the poor, a Columbia University professor told Congress.”36
Caplovitz, along with a National Crime Commission Report, asserted
that the episodes of ghetto violence were “consumer revolts” that
could be addressed by more aggressive actions by Federal agencies to
“protect the American consumer.”37
The solid logic of his theory, its grounding in data, and its
compatibility with liberal, progressive thinking made the arguments
compelling. For many middle-class, white Americans, this approach

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 94.
Id. at 99–100.
Id. at 116–17.
See generally Hilda Siff, Book Note, 2 WELFARE IN REV. 29 (1964).
See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 2, at 188–92.
See generally Siff, supra note 31.
See Robertson, supra note 14, at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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had virtues: the causes of urban unrest could be addressed through
liberal consumer reforms alone. Because everyone in the white
middle-class community had also experienced economic mistreatment
at one time or another at the hands of sellers, viewing the rioting as
an outgrowth of that mistreatment was more understandable and less
threatening than viewing the rioting as race or capitalism-based.
During the late 1960s, Caplovitz probed more deeply into the legal
disadvantages associated with being a poor consumer.38 He called for
reconsideration of basic contract law doctrine and urged government
agencies and those trained in law to reexamine traditional concepts
and systems.39 Freedom of contract, he said, had come into question
because “inequality in understanding and bargaining power can yield
bargains that the courts cannot in good conscience enforce. Even the
venerable status of the so-called ‘holder in due course’ . . . who takes
a negotiable note innocently by endorsement and is freed of
defenses” needed to be re-thought in light of the behavior of
“unscrupulous merchants and cooperating finance companies.”40
New laws, he wrote, should be created to regulate installment sales
and door-to-door sales.41
Thoughtful readers were inspired to suggest reforms of their own.
One reader urged law students to “volunteer their services to help
supply manpower needs” to the Caplovitz’s proposed “clinics.”42 An
attorney in the New York Consumer Frauds Bureau elaborated on
Caplovitz’s observation that the law’s “image of the consumer is
incorrect since it is based on a model of a ‘sophisticated’ buyer
whereas unsophisticated ones deserved protection for their
reasonable consumer expectations.”43
The Poor Pay More stimulated many of the consumer protection
reforms that characterized the brilliant law reform efforts of the late
1960s and early 1970s. Law students, for instance, will surely have
studied the Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture case, decided by
Judge Skelly Wright, in their first-year contracts class.44 That case,
38. See generally, e.g., David Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society,
33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 641 (1968).
39. Id. at 653–55.
40. Id. at 648–49.
41. Id. at 652–53.
42. Stephen Mindell, Book Review, 10 N.Y. L.F. 288, 289 (1964); see also DAVID
CAPLOVITZ, NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF CHI., CONSUMER PROBLEMS OF
THE LOW-INCOME 76, 85 (1964), http://www.consumerinterests.org/assets/docs/CIA/
CIA1964/1964_caplovitz.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJ7G-Q9LE].
43. See Mindell, supra note 42, at 290.
44. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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which held that a furniture store’s contractual cross-collateralization
provision could be considered unconscionable, was decided in 1965.
It is likely that Judge Wright had read the hardcover volume at the
time he recognized the sales practice in question as a form of
oppression of low-income consumers by low-income retailers.45
CONCLUSION
In recent decades, the basic arguments made by Caplovitz have,
with depressing frequency, been validated.46 There are far too many
examples to list. I will only mention two: one I consider tragic and
one that is in itself somewhat trivial and comic.
A study of the treatment of consumers by credit card issuers in the
wake of hurricane Katrina, in 2009 found—tragically, I think—that
magnanimity toward victims varied depending on their affluence.47
Despite the most catastrophic of circumstances affecting their
customers, most credit card issuers started insisting on repayment of
non-premium credit card balances, charging over-the-limit fees, and
reporting damaging information to credit agencies just three months
Thousands of consumer bankruptcies and
after the storm.48
uncalculated additional interest charges resulted.49 On the other
hand, beginning immediately after the hurricane, holders of the
BellSouth Platinum MasterCard and the BellSouth Platinum Business
MasterCard were directly transferred to specially trained Chase
customer service teams and were afforded emergency credit line
increases, removal of minimum payment requirements, courtesy fee
waivers, overnight emergency card replacements, and other

45. See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the
Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1399 (2014); see also J. Skelly Wright, The Courts Have
Failed
the
Poor,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.,
Mar.
9,
1969,
at
26,

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/03/09/90061728.html?pageNum
ber=347 [https://nyti.ms/2zpKKCI].
46. See generally, e.g., DONALD HIRSCH, CONSUMER FUTURES, ADDRESSING THE
POVERTY PREMIUM: APPROACHES TO REGULATION (2013); Howard Jacob Karger,
The “Poverty Tax” and America’s Low-Income Households, 88 FAMS. SOC’Y: J.
CONTEMP. SOC. SERVS. 413 (2007) (recognizing that although low-income U.S.
households account for more than $650 billion a year in buying power, they still pay
more for basic goods and services than high-income households).
47. See Norman I. Silber, Thriving on Adversity: Corporate Treatment and
Mistreatment of Consumers in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 22 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 139, 147 (2009); see also Norman I. Silber, Debts, Disasters, and

Delinquencies: A Case for Placing a Mandatory Force Majeure Provision into
Consumer Credit Agreements, 34 N.Y. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 760, 761 (2010).
48. See Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 47, at 147–48.
49. Id. at 149–50.
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privileges.50 Preferred MasterCard holders could defer payments and
receive waivers of late and over-limit fees.51 None of their accounts
would be reported to credit bureaus as delinquent.52 These privileges
were not conferred upon all of Chase’s customers.53
Comical, but offering an insight into more disturbing phenomena,
is the story told recently on a Washington Post blog about two
investigators at the University of Michigan who established,
rigorously, that the poor even pay more for toilet paper.54 With a
data base of 100,000 American households over seven years, they
tracked nearly 3 million toilet paper purchases and found that the
poor were less likely than wealthier households to buy bigger
packages, or to time their purchases to take advantage of sales.55 By
failing to do so, they paid about 5.9% more per sheet of toilet paper, a
little less than what they saved by buying cheaper brands in the first
place (8.8%).56
***
The contributors to this Symposium Issue of the Fordham Urban
Law Journal carry forward the inquiry into the necessity for better
understanding the role of consumer law in the perpetuation of
poverty, injustice, and social disorder. In the United States, and all
over the world, social scientists and lawyers continue to confirm that
the poor too often do pay more.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 168–69.
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id.

Emily Badger, Why the Poor Pay More for Toilet Paper—And Just About
Else,
WASH.
POST:
WONKBLOG
(Mar.
8,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/08/why-the-poor-pay-morefor-toilet-paper-and-just-about-everything-else [https://perma.cc/V8DA-8HRU].
55. Id.
56. Id.
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